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It is typically difficult to determine whether households invest optimally. But sometimes, investment
incentives are strong enough to create sharp normative restrictions. We identify employees at seven
companies who are eligible to receive employer matching contributions in their 401(k) and can make
penalty-free withdrawals for any reason. For these employees, contributing less than the match threshold
is a dominated action that violates the no-arbitrage condition. Nevertheless, between 20% and 60%
contribute below the threshold, losing as much as 6% of their annual pay. Providing employees with
information about the free lunch they are foregoing fails to raise contribution rates.
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Do households make investment mistakes? It is typically difficult to prove that they do, 
despite widespread concern about household financial literacy (e.g. Campbell, 2006; Bernheim, 
1994, 1995, 1998; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). The household investment problem is 
sufficiently complex and economic theory sufficiently rich that few restrictions can be imposed 
on the range of investment behaviors we should observe in the absence of errors. Nearly any 
choice can be normatively justified by some combination of preferences and information 
unobserved by the econometrician. 
In this paper, we identify a sizeable group of employees at seven companies whose 
observable choice set does include actions that are precluded by normative economic theory. 
These individuals are over 59½ years old and have their 401(k) contributions matched by their 
employer; that is, for every dollar they contribute up to a certain threshold, their employer makes 
an additional proportional matching contribution. They furthermore have virtually unconstrained 
access to their 401(k) balances because their company allows employees over 59½ to make 
penalty-free 401(k) withdrawals for any reason, even while still employed by the company.
1 For 
these workers, a contribution rate below the match threshold is a dominated strategy that violates 
the no-arbitrage condition for their portfolios. Nevertheless, we find that many of them are not 
contributing up to the match threshold. 
We calculate the arbitrage losses for these individuals by computing the difference 
between the payoff to the current (dominated) investment strategy and the payoff to an 
alternative (undominated) strategy. The alternative strategy is simple: Increase the flow of 
before-tax 401(k) contributions up to the match threshold and withdraw these contributions soon 
after they are made. The contribution increase triggers instantaneous windfall gains because of 
the employer match. Relative to the original strategy, the alternative strategy raises the 
employee’s wealth inside the 401(k) plan while leaving her resources outside the plan 
unaffected. This “contribute and withdraw” strategy may not be an optimal savings strategy, but 
it nevertheless dominates the original policy of contributing below the match threshold.  
                                                 
1 In particular, employees do not have to document financial hardship in order to access their balances. There are 
two potential penalties associated with making a withdrawal. First, there is a 10% (federal) tax penalty levied on 
individuals under the age of 59½. Second, some companies prohibit employee contributions for a period of time 
after a withdrawal, which precludes receipt of matching contributions during that time as well. Neither of these 
penalties applies to the individuals we identify: their firms do not limit future contributions after withdrawals, and 
they are over the age of 59½.   4
The arbitrage losses from not contributing at least to the match threshold can be 
substantial. Consider a 60-year-old employee who does not currently contribute to her 401(k) 
plan but whose company would match her contributions dollar-for-dollar up to 6% of her salary. 
If her annual salary is $52,000, then the incremental value of contributing up to the match 
threshold is $2,000 × 6% = $120 in match money every two-week pay period. Executing the 
withdrawal strategy, she would end up with an extra $3,120 in her 401(k) account each year. 
Alternatively, if the firm allows it, she could also withdraw the $3,120 in employer matching 
contributions as well and increase her consumption by $3,120 (minus taxes) per year without 
decreasing her assets relative to her non-contributing strategy. 
Despite the large risk-free gains from contributing up to the employer match threshold, 
we find that, depending on the company, between 20% and 60% of older employees picked a 
dominated contribution rate—one that is below the match threshold. The arbitrage losses for 
these individuals are bounded above by the total matching contributions available to them. 
Averaging across employees with a strictly positive loss, the (firm-level) average loss ranges 
from 24% to 98% of the employees’ maximum possible arbitrage loss. As a percent of salary, 
this translates into an average annual loss that ranges from 0.66% ($160) at the company with the 
least generous match to 2.32% ($782) at the company with the most generous match. These 
averages mask much larger losses in the right tail. For example, in the company with the most 
generous match, the largest loss was $7,596, in 1998, or 6.0% of the worker’s salary. 
The fact that so many employees in our sample fail to take full advantage of the employer 
match is especially surprising because one would expect this population to be aware of the 
benefits of a 401(k) savings plan. Since the people that we study are at least 59½ years old, the 
need for retirement savings should be salient to them. Having decades of experience managing 
their money, they should be more financially savvy than their younger counterparts. And with a 
(firm-level) average length of employment between 5.9 years and 22.5 years, they have had 
ample time to familiarize themselves with their 401(k) plans. 
We have noted that implementing the “contribute and withdraw” strategy is not 
necessarily the global optimum for an employee. Therefore, the utility loss associated with these 
arbitrage losses is a lower bound on an employee’s total utility losses from imperfect 
optimization. This lower bound may be well below the total utility losses from non-optimizing 
behavior. If an employee’s portfolio fails to clear the minimal hurdle of no-arbitrage, the   5
employee may be making other (more subtle) optimization errors in her consumption and 
investment choices.  
To better understand why older employees do not take full advantage of their 401(k) 
match, we conducted a survey/field experiment with the help of Hewitt Associates, the firm that 
supplied our 401(k) data. We find evidence that employees who are not fully exploiting the 
employer match are more prone to delay taking other profitable actions, suggesting that time-
inconsistent preferences play a partial role in undermining optimal investment choices. Survey 
responses also indicate that neither perceived direct transactions costs nor utility satiation explain 
the failure to contribute to the match threshold. Rather, these individuals appear to be much less 
financially sophisticated and knowledgeable about their firm’s 401(k) plan. Nevertheless, 
highlighting the foregone match money to a randomly selected treatment group—while 
explaining that there is no loss of liquidity from contributing up to the match threshold—
produced only an infinitesimal response, raising 401(k) contribution rates by only one-tenth of 
one percentage point relative to the control group. In this instance, providing better information 
did not lead to better choices. 
Our findings are related to other research on unexploited arbitrage. Gross and Souleles 
(2002) document that some households simultaneously hold high-interest credit card debt and 
low-interest checking balances.
2 Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) and Barber and Odean (2004) 
identify unexploited tax arbitrage by households who hold heavily taxed assets in taxable 
accounts and lightly taxed assets in tax-deferred accounts.
3 Amromin, Huang, and Sialm (2007) 
argue that some U.S. households who pay their mortgages down more quickly than a 30-year 
amortization schedule requires would be better off saving the prepayment amounts in a tax-
deferred account instead.
4 Warshawsky (1987) highlights the unexploited arbitrage opportunities 
available to individuals with whole life insurance policies who, due to increases in market 
                                                 
2 Some authors have argued that such holdings are not no-arbitrage violations because demand deposits and credit 
cards are not perfect substitutes, differing in transaction utility and treatment under bankruptcy (Bertaut and 
Haliassos, 2002; Lehnert and Maki, 2002; Haliassos and Reiter, 2007; Zinman, 2007). 
3 Theoretical research has been divided on whether such allocations are in fact suboptimal (Amromin, 2003; 
Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang, 2004; Garlappi and Huang, 2006). 
4 This strategy is vulnerable to interest rate changes, moving-related prepayment risks, liquidity shocks, and tax law 
changes.   6
interest rates subsequent to their policy purchase, could borrow against their policy’s cash value 
at rates below what they could earn by investing in similarly risky outside assets.
5  
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our data and the procedures we used 
to select our sample. Section II discusses the methodology we use to calculate arbitrage losses in 
the 401(k) plan. Section III presents the arbitrage loss calculation results and compares the 
401(k) contribution behavior of employees over 59½ years of age with their younger coworkers. 
Section IV presents the survey/field experiment and discusses potential reasons why individuals 
are reluctant to contribute up to the match threshold. Section V concludes by discussing the 
efficacy of educational interventions and monetary incentives for raising the savings rate of low 
savers. 
 
I. Data Description 
Our data come from Hewitt Associates, a large benefits administration and consulting 
firm. The sample consists of a year-end 1998 cross-section of all employees at seven firms.
6 This 
cross-section contains demographic information such as birth date, hire date, gender, and 
compensation. The cross-section also contains point-in-time information on each employee’s 
401(k) outcomes, including participation status in the plan, date of first participation, the elected 
contribution rate at the time of the snapshot, and total balances. In addition, the cross-section has 
annual measures of individual and employer contribution flows into the 401(k) plan. 
We selected these seven firms because they offer an employer match and it is possible for 
employees over the age of 59½ to make 401(k) withdrawals for any reason without penalty (such 
as an ensuing freeze on future contributions or matches), even while still employed at the 
company. The companies span many different industries: consumer products, electronics, health 
care, manufacturing, technology, transportation, and utilities.  
Table 1 summarizes the 401(k) plan rules at these seven firms. Employees at all firms can 
make contributions using before-tax money, and some firms also allow contribution of after-tax 
money. The maximum gain from the company match in our sample is 6% of annual salary for 
certain employees at Company A who are matched at a 100% rate for the first 6% of their pay 
                                                 
5 The extent of such unexploited arbitrage depends on assumptions about the rate of return on other assets, 
individuals’ access to outside investments of similar risk, individuals’ marginal tax rates, and the amount of 
measurement error in the survey data used. 
6 At one of these companies, we were also able to conduct a field experiment.  At this company we have additional 
cross-sectional snapshots for August 1, 2004 and November 1, 2004.   7
contributed to the 401(k) plan. Company C offers the smallest potential gain of 0.75% of annual 
salary, as it only matches 25 cents per dollar for the first 3% of pay contributed. 
  Employees do not have access to their employer match money until it is vested. If an 
employee is only 80% vested when he leaves the company, he forfeits 20% of the balances 
accrued in his employer match account. If the employer allows withdrawals from the match 
account, an employee can only withdraw the vested amount. The fraction of match money vested 
is typically a function of an employee’s tenure at the company. In our sample of firms, 
Companies C, F, and G use a graded vesting schedule in which the fraction of match balances 
vested increases gradually with years of service until the employee is 100% vested. In contrast, 
Companies A, B, and E have cliff vesting schedules in which employees are not vested at all 
before achieving five years of tenure and are 100% vested thereafter. Employer match 
contributions at Company D are fully vested immediately. Four of the companies with graded or 
cliff vesting schedules fully vest employees who reach a certain age even if they would not be 
fully vested based on their tenure (Companies B, C, E, and G). 
  Not being vested can eliminate the arbitrage gains from contributing up to the match 
threshold. If an employee is not vested and knows that she will leave the company before 
becoming even partially vested, then the employer match is worth nothing to her.
7 On the other 
hand, the employer match should be fully valued if the currently unvested employee is 
completely confident that she will stay at the company until she is fully vested. It turns out that 
the vast majority of our over-59½ sample is already fully vested at the beginning of 1998, so 
vesting is not an issue. Nonetheless, we account for incomplete vesting in our computation of 
potential arbitrage gains (the methodology for doing so is described in Section II). 
  The effort and time cost of executing the “contribute and withdraw” strategy could 
reduce or eliminate potential arbitrage gains. These costs, however, are minimal since all seven 
firms allow participants to request withdrawals by calling a toll-free number. Four of our 
companies have 401(k) plan documents that even report check processing times; three of these 
companies indicate that they issue checks within a week of the request, and the fourth mails 
checks in two to three weeks. Our survey evidence—reported in Section IV—indicates that 
employees do not believe transactions in their 401(k) are time-consuming. Furthermore, the 
financing cost of withdrawing infrequently—e.g. once every three months rather than every pay 
                                                 
7 These employees may still realize some tax benefit if they participate in the 401(k).   8
cycle—are small. Even if the cost of capital is calibrated with a typical credit card interest rate 
(e.g. 15%), an employee with a $50,000 annual salary and a 6% 401(k) contribution rate will pay 
only $14 per quarter to borrow the funds necessary to finance the savings plan contributions.
8 If 
the cost of capital is the foregone after-tax earnings in a money market account (5% interest), 
this costs less than $3 per quarter. Because the “carrying cost” is small, the “contribute and 
withdraw” policy can be implemented on a quarterly basis without substantial loss of efficiency.
9  
Table 2 reports summary demographic statistics as of year-end 1998 for the 5,045 active 
employees in our sample who were older than 59½ at the beginning of 1998, eligible to receive 
matching contributions at the beginning of 1998, and whose 1998 salary exceeded that of a full-
time worker earning the federal minimum wage.
10 For the sake of comparison, we also present 
demographic statistics on the match-eligible population younger than 59½ earning more than the 
salary cutoff at these firms. 
 
II. Calculating Arbitrage Losses 
We calculate arbitrage losses as the difference between the matching contributions 
individuals actually received in 1998 and the maximum possible match they could have received 
based on their compensation, the employer matching formula, and the IRS contribution limits. 
This difference represents the additional 401(k) balances they would have accrued (before capital 
gains) by following the “contribute and withdraw” strategy. There are two relevant IRS 
contribution limits. First, IRS section 402(g)(3) sets a maximum dollar limit on an employee’s 
before-tax contributions, which was $10,000 per year in 1998. Second, IRS section 415(b)(1)(A) 
prohibits employee 401(k) contributions out of annual compensation above a certain amount, 
which was $160,000 in 1998. (Both thresholds have increased in subsequent years.) In a plan that 
matches 100% of contributions up to 5% of salary, an employee who earned $200,000 in 1998 
                                                 
8 This amounts to (Average debt of 6% of 1.5 months of salary) × (monthly salary of $50,000/12) × (interest rate of 
15%) × (1/4 of the year) = $14 per quarter. 
9 Small carrying costs also imply that minimum withdrawal amounts and/or maximum 
withdrawal frequency restrictions have small costs. 
10 The annual salary cutoff we use is $5.15/hour × 35 hours/week × 50 weeks/year = $9,012.50.   9
could only receive a maximum of $8,000 that year in matching contributions ($160,000 × 0.05). 
We take both of these restrictions into account when calculating arbitrage losses.
11 
  As previously discussed, an employee’s valuation of the match may be significantly 
affected by her vesting status. Because we do not know each unvested employee’s subjective 
probability of leaving the company before becoming vested, we adopt a conservative approach to 
incorporating vesting into our loss calculations. The loss from not contributing up to the 
employer match threshold is calculated as the employer match foregone multiplied by the 
employee’s vested percentage at the time of the contribution.
12 For example, consider an 
employee in a firm with a dollar-for-dollar match up to 5% of pay whose vesting percentage 
increases from 0% to 20% on July 1, 1998. In calculating the 401(k) losses in calendar year 
1998, this approach would not include any foregone matching contributions prior to July 1, 1998. 
After this date, when the employee’s vesting percentage increases to 20%, her calculated losses 
are only 20% of the foregone employer match. So if this employee contributed 2% of her salary 
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Note that this calculation will understate expected losses by ignoring all continuation values 
from receiving the match. In unreported results, we find that calculating ex post losses using the 
employee’s actual subsequent employment history at the company yields numbers that are only 
slightly greater.
13 The reason for this similarity is that almost all sample employees over 59½ 
years old are fully vested as of January 1, 1998. 
Contributions to 401(k) plans are usually made with before-tax dollars. Withdrawals from 
before-tax 401(k) balances are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate on the entire withdrawal 
amount. Thus, in our withdrawal strategy, when the incremental contribution up to the match 
threshold is withdrawn, its entire amount is taxed as ordinary income. However, if the employee 
continued to contribute less than the match threshold, the incremental contribution amount would 
                                                 
11 Because the match threshold for employees in our sample does not exceed 6%, the $10,000 contribution limit 
does not in practice constrain any employees from receiving the full employer match available under their plan rules 
once the $160,000 compensation limit is accounted for.  
12 Because we only observe an employee’s total contributions for a calendar year, we assume that the contribution 
rate was constant throughout that year. 
13 We use cross-sectional data from future years at these companies for these alternative calculations.    10
have been immediately taxed as ordinary income anyway. Therefore, the withdrawal strategy 
does not affect the employee’s current tax liability if both contributions and withdrawals are 
made to and from the before-tax 401(k) account. 
In some of our companies, employees have the option to contribute using after-tax 
dollars. At Companies A, D, and F, after-tax 401(k) balances must be depleted first when 
withdrawing money from the plan.
14 Withdrawals from after-tax balances are taxed only on 
accumulated capital gains. Therefore, if one has after-tax balances, the ability to shift 
withdrawals from those balances into years when one’s marginal tax rate is high is a potentially 
valuable option.
15 Executing our withdrawal strategy eliminates the option to delay after-tax 
withdrawals at Companies A, D, and F. 
Only 17% of employees older than 59½ who contribute less than the match threshold at 
these three firms have after-tax account balances. In order to avoid having to calculate the loss 
caused by early withdrawals from the after-tax account, we simply do not attribute arbitrage 
losses to anybody at these three firms who had a positive balance in her after-tax account at year-
end 1998, regardless of her 401(k) contribution rate. This conservative assumption leads us to 
understate the fraction of employees who are foregoing a free lunch.  
Finally, to allow for the possibility of rounding error, we do not classify an employee as 
failing to fully exploit the employer match if the gap between the actual and possible match 
received is less than 0.1% of annual income. 
 
III. Frequency and Magnitude of Arbitrage Losses 
  Table 3 reports the frequency and magnitude of unexploited 401(k) arbitrage in 1998. 
Between 20% and 60% (a median of 31%) of match-eligible employees over 59½ at our seven 
firms did not receive the full employer match despite being at least partially vested and having 
no after-tax balances. The most an individual can lose due to unexploited arbitrage is the total 
matching contribution available to them that immediately vests. At Company C, which offers the 
smallest match, this upper bound is 0.75% of salary. At the other extreme, Company A offers a 
match as large as 6% of salary for some of its employees. Among those with arbitrage losses, the 
                                                 
14 Company D no longer allowed after-tax contributions at year-end 1998, so any after-tax balances present are 
legacies of a prior plan regime. 
15 As an extreme example, suppose that the tax rate on 401(k) withdrawals next year jumped to 100%. Then before-
tax 401(k) balances cannot fund consumption in that year, whereas after-tax balances could still be used.   11
average loss as a fraction of the maximum potential loss ranges from 24% to 98%, with a median 
of 72%. Conditional on having a loss, the average loss was 0.66% of salary ($160) at Company 
C, and 2.32% of salary ($782) at Company A. The proportion lost relative to the maximum 
possible loss is driven largely by the fraction of employees who contributed nothing at all. 
Companies D and G are notable for having a relatively small number of non-participants; at the 
other five companies, at least half of those with arbitrage losses gave up the entire match. 
  The bottom half of Table 3 shows the distribution of arbitrage losses among those whom 
we classify as having an arbitrage loss. In companies with a generous match, the losses at the 
right tail of the distribution are considerable. For example, the 75th percentile arbitrage losses at 
Companies A, E, and G are around $1,000 and at least 3% of salary. At the 90th percentile, 
arbitrage losses at Company D and F also exceeded $1,000, or 4.5% and 2.1% of salary, 
respectively. The maximum dollar arbitrage loss ranges from $947 (2% of salary) at Company B 
to $7,596 (6% of salary) at Company A. 
  Three of the seven firms in our sample (Companies A, D, and F) invest the match in 
employer stock and restrict diversification for those over age 59½. Since a match in employer 
stock is worth less than a match that can be diversified, our calculations for these four companies 
may overstate the money metric utility loss from unexploited arbitrage.
16 However, it is not clear 
how to quantify this bias. First, employees do not seem to regard diversification restrictions as 
particularly onerous. Benartzi (2001) documents that among companies that match in employer 
stock, participants voluntarily hold an average of 29% of their own contributions in employer 
stock as well. Benartzi et al. (2004) report that 20% of their survey respondents would 
paradoxically prefer $1,000 of employer stock which they could not diversify until age 50 to 
$1,000 invested without restrictions. Second, the diversification restrictions only partially affect 
the over-59½ employees at these three firms. Company A allows complete diversification after a 
two-year holding period or five years of plan participation; Company D allows complete 
diversification after a two-year holding period; and Company F allows salaried employees to 
diversify half of the match after age 55 or five years of service at the company. All of the 
employees in our sample are at least 59½ years old, and their average tenure in these three firms 
ranges from 16.0 years to 22.2 years. 
                                                 
16 Several papers calculate discounts for portfolios that are partially invested in employer stock (Poterba, 2003; 
Meulbroek, 2002; and Brennan and Torous, 1999).   12
  Even after accounting for any discount employees might place on a match in employer 
stock, Table 3 is likely to grossly understate the cumulative magnitude of arbitrage losses over 
time because the losses in Table 3 are calculated over a period of only one year. Most of those 
with arbitrage losses in our sample have had several years of tenure with their firm since age 
59½. Thus, they have been forfeiting matching contributions for many years, leading to much 
larger cumulative losses. For example, among those who contributed nothing to their 401(k) plan 
in 1998, between 27% and 71% have never contributed to the plan.
17 We do not attempt an exact 
calculation of these cumulative amounts because doing so would require information on 401(k) 
eligibility, the 401(k) match, employee compensation, and employee contribution rates for many 
years before 1998, which we do not have. But a simple extrapolation from Table 3 suggests that 
substantial cumulative losses are probable for many of these individuals. 
  Table 4 displays similar calculations using a much simpler loss definition than that in 
Table 3. In Table 4, we include the full amount of any matching contribution foregone, without 
regard to the employee’s age, vesting status, or the impact of capital gains taxes on after-tax 
account withdrawals.
18 Note that the arbitrage losses in Table 3 are a strict subset of the matches 
foregone in Table 4. 
  We present Table 4 for two reasons. First, we would like to compare the behavior of 
employees older than 59½ to that of employees younger than 59½. However, the “contribute and 
withdraw” strategy is largely infeasible for employees younger than 59½ because they must 
demonstrate financial hardship in order to withdraw money from their 401(k).
19 Thus, the 
arbitrage losses calculated in Table 3 for employees older than 59½ do not extend in a 
straightforward way to younger workers. We can, however, simply compare the total matching 
contributions foregone by older and younger employees. Second, other 401(k) datasets may not 
contain all of the information needed to calculate arbitrage losses as we have here. The simpler 
                                                 
17 We calculate these numbers by dividing the fraction of those with arbitrage losses who have never enrolled in the 
401(k) by the fraction of those with arbitrage losses who contributed nothing in 1998. 
18 To allow for rounding error, we continue not to classify as losers those who lost less than 0.1% of annual salary in 
matching contributions. 
19 Firms are not required to allow employees to make hardship withdrawals, although many do so. Withdrawals are 
subject to a 10% tax penalty for employees younger than 59½. There are some circumstances under which younger 
employees can avoid the penalty. These include permanent disability, a court order pursuant to a divorce, medical 
expenditures in excess of 7.5% of income, and some cases of early retirement or permanent layoff. Home purchases, 
educational expenses, or general financial hardship do not exempt employees from the tax penalty on early 
withdrawals.   13
measure in Table 4 allows for easier comparability of this paper’s results with tabulations from 
other data sources. 
  The top half of Table 4 presents statistics on employees older than 59½. Between 20% 
and 72% of employees over 59½ contribute below the match threshold. Note that at most of our 
companies, these fractions are not that much higher than the fractions with arbitrage losses in 
Table 3. This is because most older employees not contributing up to the match threshold are 
able to unambiguously profit from the “contribute and withdraw” strategy: they are almost all 
vested in the employer match, and only a small minority have after-tax balances. The average 
employer match foregone in Table 4 among older employees is thus similar to the average 
arbitrage loss in Table 3. 
  The bottom half of Table 4 presents statistics on match-eligible employees younger than 
59½. Interestingly, the fraction of employees contributing below the match threshold is generally 
similar among younger and older employees; this proportion differs by no more than 11 
percentage points across the age divide with the exception of Company G. There is, however, 
one notable difference between those older and younger than 59½: employees younger than 59½ 
under the match threshold are more likely to be contributing something to the 401(k), whereas 
older employees under the match threshold are more prone to contribute nothing   at all. There is 
no systematic tendency for younger employees under the threshold to forego more match dollars 
as a percent of their salary than older employees under the threshold. However, the absolute 
dollar amounts forfeited by younger employees under the threshold are usually higher. 
  In Figure 1, we pool all of the match-eligible employees in our seven companies and plot, 
by age, the fraction of employees over the age of 59½ with arbitrage losses, as well as the 
fraction of employees who contribute below the match threshold. Consistent with the results in 
Tables 3 and 4, these two series are similar for employees above age 59½. Over the entire 
working life, the likelihood of contributing below the match threshold is U-shaped, declining 
with age until the mid-50s and increasing thereafter. One might have expected a discrete drop in 
the likelihood of contributing below the match threshold at age 59½, when the 401(k) essentially 
becomes a liquid asset. It is thus surprising that the failure to exploit the match begins to increase 
at precisely the age when the economic reasons for 401(k) participation become most   14
compelling.
20 This may arise from a selection effect generated by low savers who are less able to 
afford to retire and thus remain in the labor force longer. Alternatively, this phenomenon may 
reflect consumption smoothing by older employees whose wages are falling and who are 
unaware of the 401(k) withdrawal privileges available only to older workers. (Table 2 shows that 
the older employees at our firms usually have a lower median wage than their younger 
counterparts). We discuss other potential explanations for older workers’ failure to exploit the 
401(k) match in Section IV.  
  To explore the characteristics associated with the failure to fully exploit the employer 
match, we present in Table 5 the results of probit regressions for the likelihood that employees 
are leaving matching contributions on the table. We pool the match-eligible employees in our 
seven firms and include firm fixed effects in these regressions. The sample in the first four 
columns is match-eligible employees older than 59½. The dependent variable in the first two 
columns is a binary indicator for having arbitrage losses in 1998, whereas in the third and fourth 
columns, the dependent variable is a binary indicator for simply contributing below the match 
threshold. In the final two columns, the sample is match-eligible employees under 59½, and the 
dependent variable is a binary indicator for contributing below the match threshold. Both the 
probit coefficients and marginal effects (slopes) at the sample means are reported. 
  The qualitative effects of most of the variables are similar across all these regressions. 
Those with higher pay are substantially less likely to leave matching contributions on the table. 
Men are 6 to 13 percentage points more likely to forego matching contributions than women, 
while those who are married are 5 to 8 percentage points less likely to forego matching 
contributions than singles. The two variables with qualitatively different results across the three 
regression specifications in Table 5 are age and tenure. Among employees younger than 59 ½, 
age is negatively related to leaving match money on the table, while the reverse is true for 
employees older than 59½, a pattern consistent with Figure 1. Finally, employees over 59½ with 
higher tenure are more likely to have arbitrage losses (first two columns), but are less likely to 
contribute under the match threshold (middle two columns). This apparent anomaly is explained 
by the fact that individuals with very low tenure tend to be completely unvested and are thus not 
classified as having arbitrage losses. 
                                                 
20 This upward turn at age 59 also appears if we instead calculate the fraction under the match threshold separately 
by company, and then compute an average that equally weights each company. The result is therefore not driven by 
certain companies having a disproportionate number of employees at certain ages.   15
 
IV. Survey/Field Experiment 
Given the low direct costs of initiating 401(k) participation, it is surprising that such a 
high fraction of employees forfeit employer matching contributions, especially among workers 
over age 59½.  
  To gain further insight into why employees are contributing suboptimally to their 401(k), 
and to see if providing information about the employer match would increase 401(k) 
contributions, we conducted a field experiment at Company A in partnership with Hewitt 
Associates. On August 3 and 4, 2004, we mailed treatment and control surveys to 889 Company 
A employees over the age of 59½.
21 All surveys were accompanied by a cover letter printed on 
the employer’s letterhead. The 889-person sample includes all 689 employees at Company A 
who were contributing less than the match threshold as of May 2004, as well as 200 randomly 
selected employees contributing at or above the match threshold. 
We randomly (and unevenly) divided our sample of 889 employees into two subgroups: a 
control group and a treatment group. We sent control surveys to approximately half of the 
employees contributing below the match threshold (344 selected at random from the population 
of 689) and to the 200 randomly selected employees contributing at or above the match 
threshold. This control survey included questions about the employee’s satisfaction with and 
knowledge about the 401(k) plan, general financial literacy, and savings preferences. 
We sent treatment surveys to the other 345 employees contributing below the match 
threshold. The treatment survey (reproduced in Appendix A) was identical to the control survey, 
except that it included an additional five questions at the end (Questions 26 through 30). 
Question 26 explains that the company matched the first 6% of salary contributed to the 401(k). 
Question 27 explains that transactions in the 401(k) could be made via the Internet, a touch-tone 
phone system, or by speaking to a benefits center representative on the phone. Question 28 
explains that penalty-free withdrawals from the 401(k) are available for any reason for 
participants over age 59½. Question 29 asks respondents to calculate the amount of employer 
match money they would lose each year if they did not contribute to the 401(k). Respondents 
received a matrix of match amounts corresponding to various match rates and salaries to aid in 
                                                 
21 We also mailed surveys to 4,000 employees below the age of 59½. Results from those respondents are available 
on request.   16
this calculation (see Appendix A). Question 30 asks if the employee is interested in raising his 
contribution rate to 6% in light of the losses calculated in question 29. We estimate that it would 
take employees about 15 minutes to complete the control survey and 20 minutes to complete the 
treatment survey. 
For 200 employees in each of the three groups (below the match threshold control group, 
above the match threshold control group, below the match threshold treatment group), we 
included a $1 bill with the survey and promised to send them a $50 American Express Gift 
Cheque if they responded no later than August 27, 2004 in an enclosed postage-paid envelope. 
Appendix B shows the cover letter that accompanied the survey. 
Respondents from the remaining 289 people below the match threshold who received the 
survey were entered into a raffle, along with all respondents younger than 59½, for a personal 
digital assistant, an MP3 player, and a digital camera.
22 Gift Cheques were sent and raffle prizes 
awarded on September 17, 2004. 
  A total of 232 employees over the age of 59½ responded—128 contributing below the 
match threshold and 104 contributing at or above the match threshold—resulting in an overall 
response rate of 26%.
23 Interestingly, the response rate among employees contributing at or 
above the match threshold was much higher (52%) than among employees below the threshold 
(19%), even though the former group’s median income is higher than the latter’s. Apparently, the 
difference in employees’ willingness/ability to collect cheap money in 401(k) accounts extends 
to other domains.  
  We first examine whether perceived transactions costs keep employees from exploiting 
the employer match. Responses to Question 3 of the survey indicate that in general, respondents 
believe that joining the 401(k) plan and conducting 401(k) transactions generates only modest 
time costs. The average respondent who was not participating in the 401(k) plan believed that it 
would take 1.7 hours to join the plan, 1.3 hours to change his plan contribution rate for the first 
time, and 1.5 hours to change his plan asset allocation for the first time. The average respondent 
who is actually in the 401(k) plan reported even lower averages of 1.4, 0.6, and 0.6 hours, 
                                                 
22 Budget constraints precluded us from offering a $50 Gift Cheque to all respondents. Assignment to the Gift 
Cheque and raffle groups was random, and comparing the characteristics (age, compensation, tenure, participation in 
the 401(k) plan) of employees who received these different response incentives suggests that the two groups are 
indeed very similar. There were three raffle winners, one for each of the prizes. 
23For employees older than 59½ and contributing below the match threshold, the response rate was 24% among 
those receiving the $50 American Express Gift Cheque and 11% among those entered into the raffle.   17
respectively, for these three actions. Consistent with these responses, among the employees who 
claimed in question 23 that they did not ever plan on enrolling in the 401(k), none cited in 
question 25 the time it takes to enroll as a reason for non-participation. Therefore, the perceived 
time costs of conducting transactions in the 401(k) are not large enough to justify the sizeable 
amounts of money employees below the match threshold forego. Our survey does not measure 
the indirect transactions costs of 401(k) participation, such as the costs of figuring out one’s 
optimal 401(k) contribution rate and asset allocation. The evidence on financial literacy 
discussed below indicates that these may be substantial. 
We now consider whether those who were not contributing up to the match threshold felt 
little need to save more for retirement. Is their current wealth high enough that there is little 
value to further increasing consumption during retirement? This possibility is rejected by the 
data. Consistent with other survey evidence on the relationship between actual and perceived-to-
be-optimal savings rates (e.g., Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2002; Bernheim, 1995; 
Farkas and Johnson, 1997), 86% of employees below the match threshold and 70% of employees 
at or above the match threshold do not think they are saving enough, according to Question 16. 
Those under the threshold report in Question 15 an average actual savings rate of 7.4% but 
believe they should be saving 17.1%. The corresponding averages for those at or above the 
threshold are 15.3% and 20.0%, respectively.
24 Remarkably, among respondents who think they 
should be saving more, only 33% of those below the threshold and 22% of those at or above the 
threshold report being unable to do so in Question 16; the remainder claim they could afford to 
save at least $520 more per year ($10 per week).  
  Having ruled out several mechanisms that might explain why so many employees fail to 
fully exploit their employer match, what does matter? We find striking differences in financial 
literacy between those contributing under the match threshold and those contributing at or above 
the match threshold. For example, only 8% of those under the match threshold report themselves 
to be a very or relatively knowledgeable investor, compared to 20% of those at or above the 
match threshold. This self-perceived lack of financial expertise is borne out in the answers to 
more objective questions on financial literacy. For example, in their response to Question 20, 
53% of employees below the match threshold incorrectly believe their own employer’s stock to 
                                                 
24 Despite these stated convictions about optimal savings rates, only 30% of those under the threshold and 47% of 
those at or above the threshold were able to give an answer in Question 18 about how much wealth they would need 
to live comfortably in retirement.   18
be less risky than a large U.S. stock mutual fund. Only 26% of employees at or above the 
threshold share this erroneous belief.
25 Employees below the threshold are less knowledgeable 
about their 401(k) plan features. In Question 4, only 21% were able to correctly state their 
employer match rate, and only 27% were able to correctly state the match threshold. In contrast, 
employees at or above the threshold were able to correctly state these figures 41% and 59% of 
the time, respectively. 
Our survey responses also suggest that procrastination
26 plays some role in keeping 
people from raising their contribution rate to the match threshold. Recall that a much higher 
proportion of employees at or above the threshold (52%) than employees below the threshold 
(19%) collected $50 for completing our 15-minute survey, even though the former group’s 
median income is higher than the latter’s. In addition, the average respondent contributing at 
least up to the match threshold took 15.1 days to mail the survey back to us, while the average 
respondent below the threshold took 17.2 days. Finally, in Question 10, we find that fewer 
respondents at or above the match threshold (11%) than respondents under the threshold (16%) 
report themselves to often or almost always leave things to the last minute. These gaps are likely 
to understate the true difference in procrastination between the two groups, since the sample is 
right-truncated; the inveterate delayers never returned the survey, and non-respondents have 
saving rates that are disproportionately below the match threshold. 
The key purpose of the survey was to see by how much those contributing less than the 
match threshold would increase their 401(k) contributions if the benefits of the employer match 
and the penalty-free discretionary withdrawal rules were explained to them. Recall that we 
implemented a treatment condition that added Questions 26 through 30 to the baseline survey. 
The median respondent to Question 29 calculated that she would lose $1,200 each year by not 
contributing up to the match threshold.
27  
                                                 
25 See John Hancock Financial Services (2002) and Benartzi et al. (2004) for the results from other surveys asking 
similar questions. 
26 Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), and Carroll et al. (2007) analyze models in which time-
inconsistent preferences lead people to undersave and procrastinate. 
27 This is larger than the median arbitrage loss of $747 and average total foregone employer match of $768 reported 
in Tables 3 and 4 for Company A. However, the $1,200 median response to Question 29 was calculated relative to 
not participating at all in the 401(k) plan. A comparable calculation using data from 1998 on individuals 
contributing below the match threshold or not at all gives a median loss of $991. The remainder of the discrepancy is 
likely accounted for by increases in salaries between 1998 and 2004.     19
Table 6 presents the average 401(k) contribution rates on August 1, 2004 (immediately 
prior to the survey mailing) and November 1, 2004 (approximately two months after the 
response deadline) for employees who were under the match threshold in May 2004 (when the 
survey mailing list was finalized).
28 The average contribution rates of the control group and the 
treatment group increase over this period, but by a very small amount (0.08% of pay for the 
control group and 0.16% of pay for the treatment group).
29 The average difference in the 
contribution rate changes between the two groups was only 0.08% of pay and statistically 
insignificant. Using receipt of the treatment survey as an instrument for reading and returning the 
treatment survey, we estimate the treatment effect to be a 0.53 percentage point increase in the 
contribution rate (t-statistic 0.87). Consistent with other financial education research that tracks 
participant behavior in administrative data (Madrian and Shea, 2005; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, 
and Metrick, 2002; Duflo and Saez, 2003), it appears that giving workers information does not 
meaningfully raise their 401(k) contribution rates, even when the recommended action exploits a 
free lunch. We note, however, that our results are for a selected sample. Individuals older than 
59½ who are not contributing up to their 401(k) match threshold may be particularly insensitive 
to financial education. Other groups may be more responsive. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Despite the presence of employer matching contributions in 401(k) plans, a substantial 
fraction of employees fails to contribute up to their employer’s match threshold. For many 
employees, it is possible to rationalize their willingness to leave employer 401(k) matching 
contributions on the table by appealing to factors such as liquidity constraints, early withdrawal 
penalties, and incomplete vesting of the match. In this paper, we examine the 401(k) contribution 
choices of a group of employees for whom these explanations do not apply. These employees are 
older than 59½, receive employer matching contributions, are largely fully vested, and can 
withdraw their 401(k) balances at any time without penalty. For these employees, contributing 
below the match threshold violates the no-arbitrage condition for their portfolio. Nevertheless, 
across a sample of seven firms, between 20% and 60% of the employees do so. The average 
                                                 
28 There are fewer than 689 employees in the table because some employees left the company before November 1, 
2004. 
29 Seven members of the control group increased their contribution rate, while 8 members of the treatment did. One 
control and no treatment group members decreased their contribution rate over this same period.   20
arbitrage loss in 1998, conditional on having a positive arbitrage loss, ranges from $160 to $782 
at the seven firms in our sample, or between 0.66% and 2.32% of annual pay. The arbitrage 
losses over a longer time horizon are likely much larger. The widespread failure to exploit 
arbitrage opportunities in this context suggests that there may be additional utility losses from 
imperfect optimization in other aspects of the employees’ investing and saving problems. 
We examine several possible explanations for the failure of those over the age of 59½ to 
optimally exploit the employer match. Based on survey evidence, we rule out direct transactions 
costs and satiation. We find evidence that employees who fail to exploit the employer match are 
less financially literate than those at or above the match threshold, which may indicate 
substantial indirect transactions costs (i.e., decision-making costs) associated with 401(k) 
participation. We also find evidence for procrastination. 
Many financial education interventions are intended to increase savings rates by 
describing the benefits of saving. Consistent with previous evidence, our survey finds that most 
employees already believe that they should be saving more than they currently are. However, 
even though employees think they should save more, our effort to facilitate such savings had no 
effect. This is intriguing because we described a highly profitable savings strategy that generates 
no liquidity costs, whereas most educational interventions promote savings strategies that are not 
as easy or costless to pursue. Some employees apparently need more than just good advice. 
However, the group we study may be a particularly intractable population. 
Our results are also cause for pessimism about the ability of monetary incentives alone to 
increase savings in the left tail of the savings distribution. Despite offering costly matching 
programs with strong marginal financial incentives, the firms studied here were unable to induce 
many of their older employees to contribute up to the match threshold. Although matching alone 
does not appear sufficient to increase savings in the left tail, it may be more effective when 
combined with other interventions that account for employee passivity (Madrian and Shea, 2001; 
Benartzi and Thaler, 2004; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2002, 2004; Carroll et al., 
2007) or that sharply reduce the complexity of the savings and investment decision (Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian, 2005; Beshears et al., 2006; Duflo, et al., 2005; Mitchell, Utkus, and 
Yang, 2005). 
Finally, the results in this paper speak more generally to the role of the no-arbitrage 
condition in economic equilibria. Among the population studied in this paper, unexploited   21
arbitrage opportunities are commonly observed, despite the fact that the potential gains are large 
and the necessary strategy to capitalize on these gains is simple and widely socially encouraged. 
Our evidence suggests that in non-competitive domains like retirement saving where the failure 
to maximize cannot be exploited by others, arbitrage opportunities may persist in equilibrium. Appendix A: Treatment Survey 
1.  What percentage of your pay are you currently contributing to your 401(k)? If you 
aren’t contributing, write “0” in the blank. Don’t count employer contributions to 
your plan. 
(a) Before-tax contributions:      % of pay     I don’t know 
(b) After-tax contributions:        % of pay      I don’t know  
 
2.  For each statement, please check the box that best represents your views. 
 










(a) I have enough information 
about the rules of my 401(k) 
              
(b) I have a good under-
standing of the investment 
choices my 401(k) offers                
(c) I’m satisfied with the 
investment choices my 
401(k) offers                
(d) My 401(k) meets my 
retirement needs 
              
(e) I’d rather save for 
retirement in my 401(k) than 
outside my 401(k)                
(f) My company’s 401(k) plan 
is better than other 
companies’ 401(k) plans                
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3.  We want to know how long it took you to do certain things in the 401(k) for the first 
time. If you haven’t done these things, we want to know how long you think they 
would take you. Check the appropriate box and fill in the blanks for each of parts (a) 
through (c). 
 
(a) It   would take me/  actually took me about      hours and      minutes 
to join my 401(k) plan. 
 
(b) It   would take me/  actually took me about      hours and      minutes 
to change my contribution rate for the first time after joining the 401(k) plan. 
 
(c) It   would take me/  actually took me about      hours and      minutes 
to change the funds I’m invested in for the first time after joining the 401(k) plan 
 
 
We want to find out how well your company has communicated its 401(k) plan 
features to you. Please answer the questions without looking at your 401(k) plan 
documents. 
 
4.  Please fill in the following blanks, or indicate that you don’t know the answer. 
 
For every before-tax dollar I contribute to the 401(k) up to      % of my salary, my 
employer makes a matching contribution to the plan of       cents. 
 
              I don’t know how much my employer matches my contributions 
             
5.  Does your company’s 401(k) plan offer the following investment options? 
(a) US stock market fund          Yes        No       I don’t know 
(b) Stable value fund          Yes        No       I don’t know   
(c) Bond fund            Yes        No       I don’t know 
(d) Commodities fund       Yes        No       I don’t know 
(e) International stock fund       Yes        No       I don’t know 
(f) Your employer’s stock        Yes        No       I don’t know 
(g) Real estate investment trust     Yes        No       I don’t know 
 
6.  Which of the following statements best describes your beliefs about the withdrawal 
rules that currently apply to you in your 401(k)? (Please check only one box.) 
     If I have money in my 401(k), I can’t withdraw it 
  If I have money in my 401(k), I can withdraw it, but I will pay taxes plus a 
penalty on the withdrawal 
  If I have money in my 401(k), I can withdraw it without any penalty, but I will 
pay taxes on the withdrawal 
  I don’t know   24
7.  Which of the following statements best describes your beliefs about the loan rules 
that currently apply to you in your 401(k)? (Please check only one box.) 
  If I have money in my 401(k), I can’t take out any loans from it 
  If I have money in my 401(k), I can have a limited number of loans from it at one 
time 
    If I have money in my 401(k), I can take out as many loans as I want from it at a 
time 
  I don’t know 
 
8.  How knowledgeable an investor would you consider yourself? 
(Please check only one box.) 
  Very knowledgeable 
  Relatively knowledgeable 
  Somewhat knowledgeable 
  Less than knowledgeable 
  Not at all knowledgeable 
 
9.  Which of the following statements best describes how often you think about your 
retirement savings? (Please check only one box.) 
  I think about my retirement savings a great deal 
  I think about my retirement savings sometimes 
  I rarely think about my retirement savings 
  I never think about my retirement savings 
 
10. Which of the following statements best describes you?  
(Please check only one box.) 
  I never leave things to the last minute 
  I rarely leave things to the last minute 
  I sometimes leave things to the last minute 
  I often leave things to the last minute 
  I almost always leave things to the last minute 
 
11. Which of the following best describes your level of education?  
(Please check only one box.) 
  Some high school 
  High school degree 
  Some college 
  College degree 
  Some graduate school 
  Graduate school degree 
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12. What is your marital status? 
(Please check only one box.) 
  Single 
  Married 
  Separated 
  Divorced 
 
13. Imagine that you just won a $500 prize in a raffle. What would you do with your 
winnings? (Please check only one box.) 
  I would save the entire prize. 
  I would use the entire prize to pay down my debts. 
  I would spend the entire prize. 
  I would save      %, pay down debts with      %, and spend      %. 
      (These percentages should add up to 100%) 
 
14. Suppose that you decided to save an extra $1,000 of your annual income, and you had 
a financial planner who would help you do this. Where would you instruct your 
planner to make this investment? The dollar amounts below should sum to $1,000.  
(Please check all boxes that apply and fill in amounts to the right.) 
 
  The checking account at my bank or other financial institution  $            
  The savings account at my bank or other financial institution  $            
  An Individual Retirement Account (IRA)  $            
  My employer’s 401(k) plan  $            
  A college savings account (for example, 529 plan)    $            
  A brokerage account  $            
  A stock mutual fund outside a 401(k) plan  $            
  A bond mutual fund outside a 401(k) plan  $            
  Other (please indicate) __________________________ $             
  
15. (a) What percent of your household income do you think you should ideally be saving 
for retirement right now? If you don’t know, answer with your best guess. 
 
     % of my household income 
 
(b) What percent of your household income are you actually saving for retirement 
right now? 
 
     % of my household income 
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16. If you think you are already saving enough for retirement, check here.   
 
If not, how much more do you think you could commit to saving than you currently 
are? 
(Please check only one box.) 
  I can’t afford to save any more 
  $10 per week 
  $20 per week 
  $40 per week 
  $50 or more per week 
 
17. Suppose you decided to cut your spending by $2 a day in order to save more for 
retirement. (This comes out to saving $730 more per year.) Where would you cut 
your spending the most? 
  Food 
  Clothing 
  Entertainment 
  Alcohol/cigarettes 
    Other (please indicate) ___________________ 
 
18. About how much would your household need to have saved by the time you retire in 
order to live comfortably in retirement? 
 
I/we would need to save $_____________      I don’t know 
 
19. After you retire, do you expect your household’s monthly spending to be lower than, 
about the same as, or higher than your monthly spending right before you retire? 
(Please check only one box.) 
  Lower 
  About the same 
  Higher 
 
20. Rate each of the following investments’ riskiness on a scale of 1 to 5.  
1 indicates “no risk” and 5 indicates “very high risk.” 
 
            No risk                   Very high risk 
(a) A large US stock mutual fund    1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(b) Your employer’s stock  1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(c) A savings account at your bank     1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(d) Bonds  1     2     3     4     5    Don’t know 
(e) Stable value/money market fund  1     2     3     4     5    Don’t know 
(f) Stock of a typical Fortune 500 company   1     2     3     4     5    Don’t know 
(g) An international stock mutual fund  1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(h) An emerging markets stock mutual fund  1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know   27
 
SKIP THIS PAGE IF YOU’RE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO 
YOUR COMPANY 401(k) PLAN RIGHT NOW. 
 
 
21. For each of questions (a) through (d), please check the box that best describes your 
plans. 
In the next two months: 
 
(a) I plan to   raise /   lower /   maintain my 401(k) contribution rate 
(b) I   plan /   do not plan to make a withdrawal from my 401(k) plan 
(c) I   plan /   do not plan to take a loan out of my 401(k) plan 
(d) I   plan /   do not plan to change the mix of funds in which I am invested 
 
22. If you’re not planning on making any of the changes in question 21, check here.   
 
If you are planning on making some changes, when are you planning on making 
them?  
(Please check only one box.) 
 In the next few days 
 In the next week 
 In the next two weeks 
 In the next month 
 In the next two months 
   28
SKIP THIS PAGE IF YOU ARE CONTRIBUTING TO 
YOUR COMPANY 401(k) PLAN RIGHT NOW. 
 
23. When do you plan to begin contributing to your company’s 401(k) plan?  
(Please check only one box.) 
 In the next few days 
 In the next week 
 In the next two weeks 
 In the next month 
 In the next two months 
 In the next                 (more than two months) 
 I do not plan on ever contributing to the 401(k) plan 
 
24. If you’re not planning on ever contributing to the 401(k) plan, check here.   
 
If you are planning on contributing some day, what percent of your salary do you 
expect to contribute when you start? 
     % of my salary 
 
25. If you are planning on contributing to the 401(k) plan some day, check here.   
 
If you’re not planning on ever contributing to the 401(k) plan, what are the main 
reasons?  
(Please check all boxes that apply.) 
 I don’t want to save right now 
 I can’t afford to save right now 
 I’d rather save in accounts outside of the 401(k) 
 I don’t have enough information to know how much to save 
 I don’t understand my company’s 401(k) plan 
 It takes too long to sign up for my company’s 401(k) plan 
 There’s always a chance I might be changing jobs or retiring soon 
   My company 401(k) match isn’t high enough 
 I’m worried about the state of the stock market/financial markets 
   I’m worried about corporate scandals and accountability 
 Other. Please specify  
                                                     29
In this section, you will be told some facts about your 401(k) plan.  
 
26. Your company offers its employees a matching contribution on the first 6% of salary 
contributed to their before-tax 401(k) account. When did you become aware of this 
fact? 
(Please check only one box.) 
 I just became aware of this fact 
 I may have known this fact before, but I’m not sure 
 I definitely knew this fact before 
 
27. Your company lets you make transactions in your 401(k) by using the Internet. You 
can also call a toll-free number, where you can use an automated touch-tone system 
or speak to a benefits center representative. When did you become aware of these 
facts? 
(Please check only one box.) 
 I just became aware of at least one of these facts 
 I may have known these facts before, but I’m not sure 
 I definitely knew these facts before 
 
28. If you ever need the money in your 401(k) for any reason, you can withdraw it 
without penalty once you’re over 59½ years old. You’ll pay ordinary income tax on 
any money withdrawn that hasn’t already been taxed. When did you become aware 
that penalty-free withdrawals are available? 
(Please check only one box.) 
 I just became aware of these facts 
 I may have known these facts before, but I’m not sure 
 I definitely knew these facts before 
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29. Suppose you’re contributing $0 to your before-tax 401(k) account. How much 
employer match money would you lose each year from not contributing 6% of your 
salary?  
(Use the table below to get an approximate answer. If you aren’t sure what your employer match rate 
is, use your best guess.) 
 
Example: If your salary is $30,000 and your match rate is 50%, then your annual loss is $900. 
 
I would lose $           in matching contributions every year from contributing 
0% instead of 6% of my salary to my before-tax 401(k) account. 
 
Annual employer match lost from not contributing 
Annual Employer  match  rate 
 Salary  0%  16.7%  25%  30%  40%  50%  60%  65%  75%  100%
$10,000  $0  $100 $150 $180 $240 $300 $360 $390 $450 $600 
$20,000  $0  $200  $300  $360  $480  $600  $720  $780  $900  $1,200
$30,000  $0  $301 $450 $540 $720 $900  $1,080 $1,170 $1,350 $1,800
$40,000  $0  $401  $600  $720  $960  $1,200 $1,440  $1,560  $1,800 $2,400
$50,000  $0  $501 $750 $900  $1,200 $1,500 $1,800 $1,950 $2,250 $3,000
$60,000  $0  $601  $900  $1,080 $1,440 $1,800 $2,160  $2,340  $2,700 $3,600
$70,000 $0  $701  $1,050 $1,260 $1,680 $2,100 $2,520 $2,730 $3,150 $4,200
$80,000  $0  $802  $1,200 $1,440 $1,920 $2,400 $2,880  $3,120  $3,600 $4,800
$90,000 $0  $902  $1,350 $1,620 $2,160 $2,700 $3,240 $3,510 $4,050 $5,400
$100,000  $0  $1,002  $1,500 $1,800 $2,400 $3,000 $3,600  $3,900  $4,500 $6,000
 
30. Does your answer to the previous question make you interested in raising your 
contribution rate to 6% so you won’t lose any more employer match money? 
 Yes. I plan to do so in the next       weeks. 
 No, I’m already contributing 6% or more before-tax to the 401(k) plan. 
 No, my losses aren’t large enough. 
 I don’t know.   31
Appendix B: Cover Letter Sent to Treatment Subjects 
Dear <Company A employee>: 
Would you like to earn $50 for about 15 minutes of your time? 
Company A wants to better understand the retirement saving and investment issues facing its 
employees. We are inviting you to participate in a survey that Company A is conducting with 
researchers from Harvard University, the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and 
Hewitt Associates, the company that performs the recordkeeping for Company A Savings Plan. 
As a way of saying thanks in advance for your help with this effort, we’ve enclosed a dollar bill 
in this mailing. You will receive an additional $50 American Express® Gift Cheque from the 
researchers, simply by  
1)  Reading the Official Gift Check Rules on the reverse side of this letter 
2)  Completing the enclosed questionnaire 
3)  Mailing the questionnaire with your name and current address to Hewitt Associates in 
the postage-paid envelope provided by no later than 8/27/2004 
Gift Cheques are accepted at over a million locations—virtually everywhere American Express® 
Travelers Cheques are welcome. Returning the enclosed questionnaire indicates that you’ve fully 
read and agreed to the Official Gift Check Rules. 
Your participation in the survey is important. The responses you provide, combined with those 
provided by other employees eligible to participate in Company A Savings Plan, will help the 
researchers understand the barriers to saving and investing for retirement. All gift checks will be 
mailed three weeks after the survey closing date. 
Your responses and information are completely confidential. Company A will never see your 
individual responses to the questionnaire, and answers to questions will not be used to identify 
individuals. Hewitt will report results to Company A only in aggregate form.  




Director, Retirement Benefits 
Company A   32
Official Gift Check Rules  
American Express® Gift Cheques will be awarded only to those invited to participate in this survey. American 
Express® Gift Cheques are accepted virtually everywhere American Express® Travelers Cheques are welcomed. 
For further details regarding rules, policies and limitations that may apply to the use of American Express® 
Travelers Cheques, visit “www.aeis.com/American_Express_Gift_Cheques.html” via the internet or call (888) 853-
9899. Hewitt Associates and the Researchers are not responsible for lost, late or misdirected mail. Hewitt Associates 
and the Researchers reserve the right to cancel American Express® Gift Cheque payments if the package containing 
the Cheque is returned undeliverable. 




Void where prohibited. 
 
Each participant agrees to release, indemnify, and hold harmless Hewitt Associates, and their affiliates, parents, 
subsidiaries, advertising and promotion agencies and their respective officers, directors, employees, representatives 
and agents from any and all liability for any injuries, loss or damage of any kind to any person, including death, and 
property arising in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, from acceptance, possession, use or misuse of the gift 
check as a result of participation in the survey. 
 
In no event will Hewitt Associates, their affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, advertising and promotion agencies and 
their respective officers, directors, employees, representatives and agents be responsible for any damages or losses 
of any kind, including direct, indirect, incidental, or consequential or punitive damages arising from your 
participation in the survey. All gift checks are provided without warranty of any kind, express or implied, including 
but not limited to warranties of purchases made with gift checks, fitness for a particular purpose or non-
infringement.   33
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Dartmouth College Working Paper. Table 1. 401(k) Plan Rules of Seven Firms in 1998 
This table shows the 401(k) plan rules at our sample firms as of 1998, according to the firms’ 401(k) plan documents. 
  Company A  Company B  Company C  Company D  Company E  Company F  Company G 
Eligibility  Immediate Only  non-union 
employees after 
1,000 hours of 
service in a year 
January 1 
following hire 
3 months of service  Non-temporary 
employees after 1 
month of service 
Salaried employees 
immediate; union 
employees after 3 





















25% to 100% 
match on first 6% 
of pay contributed, 
depending on em-
ployee group 
50% match on 
first 4% of pay 
contributed 
25% match on first 
3% of pay contrib-
uted (before-tax 
contributions only) 
100% match on first 
3% of pay contrib-
uted; 50% match on 
next 3% contributed 
75% match on first 
2% of pay contrib-
uted; 50% match 
on next 3% con-
tributed 
20% to 35% match 




100% match on 
first 3% of pay 
contributed; 50% 
match on next 
3%. No match in 
1st service year. 




No No  Yes;  diversification 
restricted 
Yes; diversification 





Vesting  5-year cliff 
 
5-year cliff, or 
100% at age 65 
 
5-year graded from 
3 to 7 years of 
tenure, or 100% at 
age 65 
Immediate  5-year cliff, or 
100% upon 
retirement at or 
after age 55 
5-year graded from 




from 2 to 5 years 
of tenure, or 
100% at age 60 
Withdrawal 
restrictions 
$250 minimum; no 
more than 1 per 
month. Order of 
account depletion:  
after-tax, match, 
before-tax 





No more than 1 per 
month. Order of 
account depletion: 
after-tax, match 
dollars that have been 
in plan for more than 







draw match only if 
the money has been 
in plan for 2 years  
$100 minimum; no 
more than 6 per 











mailed next week 
Call toll-free 
number. Checks 




mailed in 2-3 
weeks 
Call toll-free number. 
Check processing 





within 1 week 
Call toll-free 
number. Check 
processing time not 




not in documents  
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Seven Firms at Year-End 1998 
The sample for all rows but the first is employees who are eligible to receive a 401(k) matching contribution at the beginning of 1998 and whose 1998 
salary is more than that of a full-time minimum wage worker. The first row includes all employees at each company, whether or not they meet the 
eligibility and salary requirements. We sort employees into age subsamples based on their age at January 1, 1998. However, all statistics are reported as of 
year-end 1998. To maintain the confidentiality of the companies analyzed, we report only the approximate number of total active employees, and we do 
not report the number of employees under the age of 59½. 
  Company A  Company B  Company C  Company D  Company E  Company F  Company G 
Total active employees   Over 20,000  Over 4,000  Over 50,000  Over 10,000  Over 20,000  Over 30,000  Over 10,000 
Match-eligible employees older than 59½ 
Number  of  employees  816 537  2,084  142 383 841 242 
Fraction  male  (%)  91.7% 82.7% 16.7% 70.4% 73.3% 65.2% 58.9% 
Average  age  (years)  62.6 68.2 64.4 62.6 62.7 63.0 63.6 
Average  tenure  (years)  16.0  5.9  14.9 18.4 22.5 22.2 12.1 
Median  salary  $32,444 $11,829 $24,704 $57,788 $40,830 $45,812 $43,711 
401(k) participation rate  82.8%  32.8% 51.2% 97.2% 68.1% 78.2% 90.1% 
Median 401(k) balance of 
participants 
$46,830 $7,635 $16,259  $47,382  $117,151  $90,983  $69,440 
Match-eligible employees younger than 59½ 
Fraction  male  81.7% 49.5% 19.1% 76.9% 70.6% 65.7% 66.0% 
Average  age  (years)  43.7 38.2 41.3 50.0 42.3 43.2 39.2 
Average tenure (years)  10.9  5.5  8.3  17.7  14.1  15.3  7.7 
Median  salary  $32,326 $23,229 $29,267 $62,111 $38,605 $46,854 $44,932 
401(k) participation rate  81.0%  44.5% 46.6% 96.7% 72.3% 81.8% 79.0% 
Median 401(k) balance of 
participants 
$30,258 $11,521  $9,136  $53,078 $45,215 $52,951 $31,669  
 
Table 3. Arbitrage Losses in 1998: Employees Over Age 59½  
The sample is employees age 59½ and older on January 1, 1998 who are eligible to receive a 401(k) matching contribution and whose 1998 salary is more 
than that of a full-time minimum wage worker. Arbitrage losses arise from not contributing at least to the match threshold, being at least partially vested in 
the match, and having no after-tax 401(k) balances. The proportion of pay lost and dollar amounts lost are sorted separately to compute the percentiles. 
  Company A  Company B  Company C  Company D  Company E  Company F  Company G 
Number with arbitrage losses  196  320  915  36  78  263  102 
Fraction  of  sample  who  have  arbitrage  losses  24.0%  59.6% 43.9% 25.4% 20.4% 31.3% 42.1% 
Maximum possible loss as a fraction of pay  1.5 to 6%  2%  0.75%  4.5%  3%  1.2 to 2.1%  4.5% 
Among  those  with  arbitrage  losses:          
     Average fraction of maximum possible loss realized  72.4%  97.5%  96.8%  23.7%  69.2%  81.4%  34.9% 
     Fraction contributing nothing  54.1%  95.0%  93.7%  11.1%  73.1%  69.6%  21.6% 
     Fraction who have never enrolled in the 401(k)  20.9%  32.5%  66.4%  5.6%  38.5%  49.4%  5.9% 
     Average loss, percent of annual pay  2.32%  1.71%  0.66%  1.07%  2.07%  1.63%  1.57% 
     Average loss, $  $782  $215  $160  $350  $722  $677  $660 
     Distribution of losses as a percent of annual pay ($)          






























































































































Table 4. Foregone Employer Matching Contributions in 1998  
The sample is all employees eligible to receive the 401(k) matching contribution and whose 1998 salary is more than that of a full-
time minimum wage worker. The ages used to sort employees into subsamples are computed as of January 1, 1998. To maintain the 
confidentiality of the companies analyzed, we do not report the number of employees under the age of 59½. 
  Company A  Company B  Company C  Company D  Company E  Company F  Company G 
Match-eligible employees older than 59½           
Number contributing less than match threshold  246  386  1,088  51  78  267  114 
Fraction of ≥ 59½ sample contributing less than 
match threshold 
30.1%  71.9% 52.2% 35.9% 20.4% 31.7% 47.1% 
Among  those  below  the  threshold:          
     Average fraction of maximum possible match  
     foregone 
74.0%  96.5% 96.6% 20.2% 69.2% 80.6% 33.9% 
     Fraction contributing nothing  56.9%  93.5%  93.5%  7.8%  73.1%  68.5%  21.1% 
     Fraction who have never enrolled in the 401(k)  30.5%  38.1%  68.8%  3.9%  38.5%  48.7%  5.3% 
     Average match foregone, percent of annual pay  2.38%  1.73%  0.72%  0.91%  2.07%  1.67%  1.52% 
     Average match foregone, $  $768  $221  $180  $313  $722  $693  $638 
Match-eligible employees younger than 59½           
Fraction of < 59½ sample contributing less than 
match threshold 
37.3%  70.6% 61.8% 46.9% 30.6% 37.1% 66.2% 
Among  those  below  the  threshold:          
     Average match foregone as percent of maximum 
     available match 
69.6%  87.8% 93.8% 23.2% 67.9% 69.7% 46.0% 
     Fraction contributing nothing  50.7%  77.5%  86.4%  7.1%  60.2%  48.8%  30.4% 
     Fraction who have never enrolled in the 401(k)  36.5%  49.5%  68.1%  0.9%  23.5%  35.6%  17.3% 
     Average match foregone, percent of annual pay  2.53%  1.44%  0.70%  1.04%  2.04%  1.40%  2.06% 
     Average match foregone, $  $840  $340  $194  $533  $726  $629  $907  
Table 5. Predictors of Arbitrage Losses or Foregoing Employer Matching Contributions in 1998 
This table presents the results of probit regressions. The dependent variable is either a binary indicator for whether an employee had 
arbitrage losses in 1998, or a binary indiator for whether an employee contributed less than the match threshold in 1998. Arbitrage 
losses arise from not contributing at least to the match threshold, being at least partially vested in the match, and having no after-tax 
401(k) balances. The sample is restricted to employees eligible for the 401(k) match and whose 1998 salary is more than that of a full-
time minimum wage worker. The ages used to sort employees into subsamples are computed as of January 1, 1998. Male and Married 
are dummies set for if the participant is male and married, respectively. Age is the participant’s age on December 31, 1998. Tenure is 
the number of years since the participant’s original hire date as of December 31, 1998. Salary is the participant’s salary in 1998. Firm 
fixed effects are included, although their coefficients are not reported. The columns labeled “Coefficient” present coefficient estimates 
from the probits. Those labeled “Slope” present marginal effects evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. The marginal 
effect reported for dummy variables is the effect of changing the variables from 0 to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
  Employees older than 59½   Employees younger than 59½  
  Dependent variable:  
Has arbitrage losses 
Dependent variable:  
Contributes less than threshold 
Dependent variable:  
Contributes less than threshold 
  Coefficient  Slope  Coefficient  Slope  Coefficient  Slope 
Male  0.3212**  0.1194** 0.3374** 0.1317** 0.1530** 0.0608** 
 (0.0515)  (0.0190)  (0.0519)  (0.0201) (0.0081) (0.0032) 
Married  -0.1611**  -0.0604** -0.2104** -0.0827** -0.1138** -0.0454** 
 (0.0445)  (0.0167)  (0.0446)  (0.0175) (0.0076) (0.0030) 
Age 0.0509**  0.0376**  0.0286**  0.0112**  -0.0069**  -0.0027** 
 (0.0056)  (0.0021)  (0.0057)  (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Log(Tenure) 0.1005**  0.0376**  -0.2405** -0.0944** -0.2175** -0.0866** 
 (0.0264)  (0.0099)  (0.0265)  (0.0104) (0.0043) (0.0017) 
Log(Salary) -0.8875**  -0.3320** -0.9451** -0.3711** -0.8805** -0.3507** 
 (0.0430)  (0.0160)  (0.0431)  (0.0169) (0.0083) (0.0033) 
Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample size  N = 5,043  N = 5,043  N = 158,986  
Table 6. Field Experiment Results 
This table shows the average 401(k) contribution rates on August 1, 2004 (pre-survey) and 
November 1, 2004 (post-survey). The sample is Company A employees contributing under 
the match threshold in May 2004. The control group received a mailed survey about their 
401(k). The treatment group received the control survey plus additional questions that 
highlighted the loss from not contributing up to the match threshold. The last column gives 
the t-statistic for the null that there is no difference between the two groups. 
  Control group  Treatment group 
t-statistic of 
difference 
Pre-survey contribution rate 
(8/1/2004) 
1.73% 1.48%  1.38 
Post-survey contribution 
rate (11/1/2004) 
1.81% 1.64%  0.86 
Contribution rate change: 
8/1/2004 – 11/1/2004  
0.08% 0.16%  0.86 


















































Contributes below match threshold Has arbitrage losses
Figure 1. Failure to Fully Exploit the 401(k) Match in 1998, by Age. This graph 
shows, by age, the fraction of match-eligible employees who either contributed below the 
match threshold or who had positive arbitrage losses in 1998. Employees in all seven 
sample firms are pooled in this graph. 
 